There is an apocryphal tale of recent popular vintage that circulates along the Mexico/United States border. It tells of an act of miscommunication, born of a mistranslation, between a Mexican immigrant traveling north and an officer of the U.S. Border Patrol trying to stem that flow. The Mexican woman named Molly was waiting in line to cross over to the American side. Finally, after hours of waiting, her interview moment with the U.S. Border Patrol agent arrived. The officer asked: "Are you Latina?" She replied: "No, no, no señor. Yo no soy la Tina. Yo soy la Molly. La Tina ya cruzó." ("No, no, no sir. I am not Tina. I am Molly. Tina already crossed.") The border agent was asking the woman about her ethnicity as a Latina. Molly, who was clearly unfamiliar with this U.S.-based ethnic category, interpreted the question as best she could. She heard "Latina" not as one word but as two—la and Tina—interpreting "la" as "the," and "Tina" as her friend's name. Indeed, her name was not Tina; it was Molly.

This story of miscommunication across national borders, when repeated, frequently provokes nervous laughter among Spanish/English bilingual speakers in the western United States. It shows how the ethnic groups and categories that are known and operate in one national space often make no sense when transported just a few miles north or south. When national regimes categorize populations, the very act of naming gives them a living reality.

Ethnic groups, whether deemed minorities in nation-states or simply identified as members of a subordinated and marginalized group in a given polity, have always resisted and defied the easy classifications of their oppressors. They generate the names
they use to refer to themselves as a collectivity, often in their own native language, thus underscoring their linguistic resistance to domination. Such group names are often rooted in religious and communal conceptions of personhood and kinship, as well as in history, language, and culture. Institutions such as the Catholic Church, professional guilds, even merchants hoping to monopolize markets for ethnic goods, have long had vested interests in naming, generating, and sustaining national understandings of group collectivity. My goals in this essay are several. At the theoretical level, I want to examine three moments in the history of what became the United States, looking at the contexts of power that produced particular understandings of social boundaries and group membership: the Spanish conquest of the indigenous peoples of Mexico's north, which started in 1598; the United States military's takeover of what became the American Southwest at the end of the Mexican War in 1848; and the mass decolonization civil rights movement undertaken by racialized minorities in the United States during the mid-1960s and early 1970s. At the lexical level, I want to show how a small set of ethnic labels, whether tied to self-understandings of group membership, to actual social behavior, or merely as text, emerged, evolved, and disappeared, only to reappear again with new meanings generations later. The emergence of ethnic labels that demarcate social boundaries occurs in different temporal registers, sometimes quite rapidly and other times more slowly.

Since the early 1970s, sociologists in the United States have been particularly fascinated by the emergence of panethnicities, which are confederations created when several distinct ethnic groups come together in alliance for social, economic, or cultural advantage, thereby augmenting their numeric power and influence around issues of common concern. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example, indigenous peoples such as the Cherokee, the Apache, and the Menominee came to be understood sociologically as "Native Americans." For several centuries conquering states had lumped them together as "Indians" in punitive ways that marked their subordination and marginalization. They had resisted such leveling, homogenization, and the eradicating of their ancestral group differences, cleaving to their own internal ways of being and knowing, and defending their language and culture from the influence of those they labeled as outsiders and whites. But indigenous peoples in the United States had many common experiences. They had long histories of genocide and domination, of wars aimed at their eradication, of territorial segregation on reservations, and of similar structural relationships to the federal government. Calling themselves "Native Americans" made sense not only as a way of consolidating their factionalized power but also of maximizing their use of civil rights, voting rights, and affirmative action policies.

Immigrants and long-time residents hailing from such divergent places as Mexico, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic began celebrating their unity as "Latinos" in the 1970s, just as persons from such distinct places as China, Japan, and Korea came to call themselves "Asian Americans" in the United States. As new panethnic groups, they protested their marginalization and the toxic legacies of racism, militated for political recognition, and petitioned the state for compensatory remedies, demonstrating not only broader levels of interaction among their different national groups but also a heightened sense of oppositional consciousness in relationship to the state. The rise of such new nationalisms is not an entirely unique or new sociological process. Historian Eric J. Hobsbawm reminds us in Nations and Nationalism since 1780, how emerging nation-states, through a process he calls "nationalism from above," transformed the residents of the ancient kingdoms of Castile, Aragón, Asturias, and León into Spaniards through mandatory language instruction, compulsory public schooling, and military service, just as the United States forged Polish, Italian, and German immigrants into Americans using these same institutions and techniques for similar ends. What is new and distinct about panethnicities is that they can emerge not only from above through the actions of states and elites, but also percolate upward from below, as acts of popular mobilization and consciousness in direct opposition to state actions.

Many of the people of European ancestry who first colonized and settled what eventually became the American Southwest migrated there from the Iberian Peninsula, from what we now call Spain, but which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was a series of independent kingdoms that were gradually aggregated, most definitively by the 1495 marriage of King Ferdinand of Aragón and Queen Isabella of Castile, which laid the foundation for the emergence of modern Spain. Several decades before the English founded Jamestown in 1607 or the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth colony in 1620, residents of Spain's medieval kingdoms had already established a permanent settlement in Saint Augustine in Florida (1565) and begun colonizing the kingdom of New Mexico, which by 1598 encompassed roughly the current states of New Mexico and Arizona. Texas's first Spanish settlements date from 1691, and those of Alta California began with the founding of San Diego in 1695. The kingdom of New Mexico and the provinces of Texas and Alta California were all situated at the northern edge of Spain's American empire, isolated from one another, surrounded on all sides by mostly hostile indigenous groups, and too distant from the major centers of Spanish culture in central Mexico and Cuba for frequent or rapid communication. What developed in each of these provinces over the centuries were distinct regional subcultures that were Spanish in name and form, but thoroughly hybrid in culture due to prolonged contact with local indigenous groups.

- National consciousness, by which I mean a sense of membership as a resident or citizen of a particular nation-state, did not exist as a well-developed sentiment among the colonists who initially left the Iberian Peninsula, migrated to Cuba and Puerto Rico, and then moved on to Mexico, eventually settling New Spain's north. What affinity they most shared and expressed was religious; they were Christians first and foremost. The fervor
of their religious sentiment was forged during the Crusades and particularly strengthened over nearly eight centuries of warfare during the Iberian Reconquest between AD 711 and 1492, when the Christian monarchs rallied their populations behind the standard of the cross, vanquishing the Moors and pushing the influence of Islam south. What victories the Christian kings won in those years were won in the name of their one true God. The year 1492 marked the acme of the Reconquest with the fall of the last Moorish stronghold in Granada, the underwriting of Christopher Columbus’s voyage of discovery westward, and the intensification of religious orthodoxy, leading to Jewish and Muslim forced conversions to Christianity, and eventually to their expulsion. From 1492 onward, Spain’s public culture was Christian to the core. The first and most distinct sense of group membership among the residents of Spain’s enormous empire was as cristianos viejos, or “old Christians.” Men and women who were firm in their faith stood ready to defend it from neophytes, from infidels and heretics, and from cristianos nuevos, or “New Christians,” which in Spain was made up of recently and forcibly converted Moors and Jews, and in the Americas of equally recent indigenous converts to the faith.3

The patria chica, the “small fatherland,” or the region of origin, was next in importance to these colonists. By the sixteenth century, each of Spain’s kingdoms had a well-developed conciencia de sí, or “self-consciousness.” After men and women proclaimed themselves Christians, they boasted of their rootedness in local affairs as Aragonese, Catalans, Galicians, and Castilians. Indeed the word the indigenous peoples of the southwestern United States first used to describe their new Spanish overlords was Castillas, meaning a person from the kingdom of Castile. Though initially the native peoples understood very little of what soldiers told them in Spanish, they did repeatedly hear them call themselves castellanos, announcing that the natives were now subjects of Castilla and that a king in Castilla was their new lord. Gaspar Peréz de Villagrán, who participated in the 1598 conquest of New Mexico and in 1610 commemorated the feats in his book Historia de la Nueva México, reported that the residents of Acoma Pueblo “called to me, crying, Castillan! Castillian! . . . Zutacapan [their chief] asked me if more Castilians followed me and how long before they would arrive.”4

Identification with Spain’s various regions persisted in the Americas into the nineteenth century, whether in Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, or Mexico. Residents of the kingdom of New Mexico called themselves nuevo mexicanos and neomexicanos, those in California referred to themselves as californios, and those in Texas as tejanos. Throughout Spanish America loyalty and a sense of attachment to the patria chica, to one’s natal place, persisted and remains strong even to this day.

The Spanish conquest and colonization of the Americas brought together men from different regions, and through their common experiences of warfare, established them as a victorious colonizing class. The men who marched into the Aztec capital at Tenochtitlán in 1519 most likely had never before thought of themselves as Spaniards, or españoles. This was so because a unitary nation-state had only begun to emerge recently, as a result of the unification of the kingdoms of Aragón and Castile, born of the 1469 marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, and because these men were more deeply invested in their Christianity and regional loyalties to place. It was in the Americas that they came to think of themselves as “Spaniards,” particularly when confronting indigenous peoples as overlords. This is how the emerging Spanish nation-state, from above, forged a panethnic sense of group membership. By calling themselves españoles the colonists acknowledged that their culture and social institutions were of Iberian origin and thus quite different from those of the indigenous peoples they called indios, or “Indians.” Three hundred years of contact between these two groups through intermarriage and cohabitation would radically transform what it meant to be español and indio, but about that there will be much more to say below.5

Just as españoles were forged in the foundry of warfare through their battlefield victories as Christian soldiers in Mexico, Central America, and Peru, so too the vanquishing of their enemies transformed America’s native peoples into indios, or “Indians.” In 1491, on the eve of the Columbian voyages, there were some 13 distinct indigenous language families spoken in the Americas, with more than 260 different languages in Mexico alone. Perhaps as many as 20 million people were living in the Valley of Mexico in 1519, in hierarchical, complex stratified theocratic states.6 But there were no Indians. Christopher Columbus invented them in 1492 by mistakenly believing that he had reached India, and thus calling them indios producing the lexical distinction we now use to refer to the Caribbean as the West Indies and to India as the East Indies. Inventing Indians was to serve an important imperial end for Spain, for by calling the natives indios, the Spaniards erased and leveled the diverse and complex indigenous political and religious hierarchies they found. Where once there had been many ethnic groups stratified as native lords, warriors, craftsmen, hunters, farmers, and slaves, the power of imperial Spain was not only to vanquish but also to define, largely reducing peoples such as the mighty Aztecs into a defeated Indian class that soon bore the pain of subjugation as tribute-paying racialized subjects.

- Militant Christian españoles colonized Hispaniola, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and New Mexico in the name of Spain’s Christian monarchs. As conquering soldiers they carried writs of incorporation (capitalizaciones) for the formation of towns, which included aristocratic titles, land grants, and tributary indios they could exploit mercilessly, but whom they were also expected to Christianize and protect. The Catholic priests who accompanied these colonists carried all the symbols in which their ethnicity was rooted: the sacred texts and stories of the Bible; the altars, crosses, and statuary that connected the terrestrial community to the celestial one; and all the religious ritual formulas that conjoined the sacred and profane, and which ordered time and space.

- Yearly in Santa Fe, New Mexico, the city’s founding is still routinely remembered by reenacting the submission of the Pueblo Indian chiefs before Don Juan de Oñate, the area’s conquistador, as it was done and described in 1598.7 This is the occasion for the staging of didactic dramas such as “The Christians and the Moors,” which in the late 1600s was marked by “loud acclamations from the soldiers, with a salvo of harquebuses,
and by skirmishes and horse races." Wooden lanterns known as *huminaria*, which are still lit on important dates of the Christian calendar, were meant to evoke memories of the heat of battle, the fire and destruction the *españoles* used to establish their supremacy over the *indios* and the imposition of their Christian God and culture. Even the bedecked and bejeweled statue of La Conquistadora, Our Lady of the Conquest, is taken annually from her venerated perch in church and processed through the streets, unifying and sanctifying the space she traverses. The messages encoded in all of these ritual acts are not lost on observers of Santa Fe's fiesta, for as a Taos Pueblo Indian woman recently pronounced, the skirmishes, the bonfires, the dramas all symbolized "the brute force the Spanish used" to conquer the land.8

The Pueblo Indians, of course, have long resisted such chauvinistic celebrations. In 1998, someone from the northern Pueblos severed the right foot of the large bronze equestrian statue of Don Juan de Oñate, the Spanish conqueror of the kingdom of New Mexico, which sits in front of the Oñate Monument and Visitors Center near Española, New Mexico. The vandal's explicit political goal was to force everyone to recall the collective punishment Oñate meted out to the residents of Acoma Pueblo in 1590 for resisting his tributary demands: every man over the age of twenty-five had one of his feet cut off, the women and children over the age of twelve were condemned to twenty years of slavery, and the children were distributed to serve as servants in Spanish households. As Andrés Lauriano, of Sandía Pueblo noted of the foot severed from the Oñate statue, "When I think of what Oñate did... I have a vision of Indian men lined up to have one foot cut off. I see the blood pouring from their legs as they crawled or hopped away. I see the bloody pile of feet left behind."9

The *españoles* who settled Mexico's north were extremely status conscious and viewed society as hierarchically ranked by religion, property ownership, occupation, race, and legitimacy of birth. Whenever anyone came before a state official, whether civil or ecclesiastical, between roughly 1600 and 1760, the first fact recorded in the legal documents was a person's *calidad*, literally his or her "quality" or "social status." Social privileges and corporal punishment were based on such standing. Thus petitions, denunciations, even routine investigations of any sort always began with a formulaic statement that established one's status and group membership. For example: Pedro López "es de calidad mestizo, obrero, hijo legítimo de María Sánchez y Fabián López, y cristiano nuevo" (Pedro López's quality is mestizo, a laborer, the legitimate son of María Sánchez and Fabián López, and a New Christian).

Starting in the 1760s, and stretching all the way into the 1820s, explicit discussions of race took on a greater importance in the establishment of one's *calidad*. Though legal color categories had been widely known and codified as the *régimen de castas* since the founding of Spain's colonies in the Americas, these were not broadly invoked by church or state functionaries at the local level until the middle of the eighteenth century, when more-extensive racial mixing began taking place. Access to marital partners and honorific posts, to desirable occupations, and even to the Roman Catholic priesthood was based on one's ability to prove one's genealogical racial purity according to the categories of the code.10

The *régimen de castas* defined precisely every possible biological mixture that could occur when Spaniards, Indians, and Africans mated and reproduced. A Spaniard and an Indian produced a mestizo. A mestizo and a Spanish woman begot a castizo. The mating of a Spanish man and a mulatto woman produced a morisco, and so on. The code spelled out for six generations of descent the exact level of biological mixing from an original set of ancestors, yielding racial categories that were quite difficult for individuals to perceive or to recognize in phenotype, much less for church and state officials to reconcile the personal declarations they were given with their own physical observations of the person who stood before them. Theoretically, this classificatory system visually fused notions of blood, ancestry, and lineage so that without reference to baptismal certificates, family histories, or personal genealogies one could quickly glance at a person's physique and just as rapidly conclude if a person was of pure blood, of gentle birth, and of an honorable past. In Spain even remotely impure blood derived from mixing with Jews, Moors, and heretics disqualified a person from high honorific posts. In the Americas contact with Indians and African slaves was deemed equally polluting. Physical color or appearance, what today we call "phenotype," became the basis by which state and church officials praised and reviled their subjects and privileged or punished the racial groups society deemed most inferior.

The *españoles* in Mexico's north in the 1760s began to imagine colonial society and themselves in much more complicated ways than the original conquest dichotomy between Spaniards and Indians allowed, precisely because the *régimen de castas* provided them with a more capacious lexicon for understanding racial difference. The reality on the ground after several generations of miscegenation was that only at the polar extremes of the racial classification system did the categories actually fit any visible physical types. The *régimen de castas* was intended to protect the privileges of local nobilities. But as the quickening of the economy undertaken by the Bourbon Reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century took hold, status increasingly became based on enterprise and personal achievement, thus displacing notions of aristocracy and social standing rooted in memory of the by then remote facts of conquest. When the crown began selling writs of whiteness, known as *gracia al sacar*, to anyone who could afford them in the 1760s, the system of racial classification was doomed, and indeed was abolished with Mexico's independence in 1821.11

Racial status was of grand importance because it was intimately associated with one's legitimacy or illegitimacy at birth. The legal scholar Juan de Solórzano y Pereira in his *Política Indiana* (1648) maintained that illegitimates were "Those born of adulterous or other illicit and punishable unions, because there are few Spaniards of honor who marry Indian or negro women; this defect of birth makes them infamous, at least infama facti, according to the weighty and common opinion of serious scholars; they carry the stain of different colors and other vices."12 Throughout the colonial period, illegitimacy was
deemed an indecent and shameful mark because of its association with mixed racial unions and the generation of race.

The multiple categories that defined a person's *razón* were intricately tied to one another. A person's reputation was a summation of these various measures of social standing, made particularly clear in social action. The fiercest fighting words one could use were slurs that impugned a person's total social personality—his or her race, ancestry, and position in the division of labor. The fight that occurred in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on June 3, 1765, between Eusebio Chávez and his father-in-law, Andrés Martín, illustrates this point. Chávez beat Martín with a large stick and dragged him by his hair, leaving Martín's arm badly bruised, his chest covered with black and blue welts, his scalp swollen out of shape, and his hair completely tangled and caked in blood. The reason: Martín had called Chávez a "perro mulato hijo de puta" (a mixed-blood dog son of a bitch). One insult, perhaps, would have been enough, but by calling Chávez a dog, Martín implied that he was less than human, a habit well understood by Spaniards who often referred to the Indians as dogs. He added that Chávez was of mixed blood, and if truly a son of a bitch, he was undoubtedly illegitimate. Martín had thus combined three statuses to insult Chávez.13

Functionaries of the Catholic Church and the Spanish state often used the same racial and ethnic categories because these were the ones that had been generated initially through the process of Christian expansion into new territories. One exception widely used in Mexico's north during the colonial period, particularly in California, was the racialized category *gente de razón*, literally "people of reason," or rational beings. Its meaning in social life is best understood through its opposite, or *gente sin razón*, "people lacking reason," as irrational persons. The Holy Office of the Inquisition concocted this legal distinction to protect the Indian from prosecution for heretical ideas. The inquisitors reasoned that the Indians were *gente sin razón*, mere children lacking the rational faculties to understand the dogmas of faith and the errors of their ways. Everyone deemed a rational person was punishable for exercising his or her knowledge and will in the commitment of evil acts. With the demise of the Inquisition in the early 1800s, the term *gente de razón* remained in circulation in Mexico's north as a way of differentiating individuals who were culturally "Spanish" from those who lived by their more traditional "Indian" ways; more infrequently it was used to differentiate fluent Spanish speakers from those who were not.

Indian slavery was a significant social institution throughout Mexico's north and accordingly generated the stigmatized *genizaro* ethnic category, which first appeared in New Mexican documents at the beginning of the eighteenth century and from there spread outward to Texas and California, where it was also recorded in the documentation of social life. The genizares were Apache, Navajo, Ute, and Comanche Indians enslaved during raids the Spaniards provoked to profit from the lucrative trade in captives. In time, Pueblo Indian foundlings abandoned by their indigenous mothers as the products of rape, as well as adults exiled from Indian towns because of some transgres-
Thus, at exception of emerged priests, who colonial and produced the mining and administrative political, 1804), regime.

When conspicuous to Puerto Rico, the residents did not immediately call themselves mexicanos or Mexicans, probably because the authority of the newly established Mexican nation-state remained fragile until 1857, torn as it was politically by conflicts among centralists and federalists, liberals and conservatives. The term mexicanos began to appear in legal documents and census records only in the 1830s, and then, for only a small percentage of the population. In New Mexico only about 5 percent of all individuals who married legally between 1810 and 1830 claimed that they were mexicanos. The rest continued calling themselves españoles. As the newly established Mexican nation-state bestowed large land grants on individuals willing to settle the north, particularly in those poorly protected frontier areas coveted by England, the United States, France, and Russia, and under constant attack by the Apache and Comanche Indians, the category mescino took on increasing importance, differentiating these proprietor citizen males from landless peasants.16

Mexico was faced with numerous challenges between 1821 and 1860, which the wars of independence left it ill prepared for. The new state emerged weak and remained fragile because of the constant wars and invasions Mexico experienced in this period. It waged a century-long war against the Comanches and Apaches in the north, Texas rebelled and gained its independence in 1836. The French invaded and occupied Mexico in 1858–1859, and again in 1861–1867. The United States invaded Mexico in 1846, and at war’s end in 1848, seized its northern provinces. Throughout all of this, Mexico was at war with itself, ripped apart by conflicts between liberals and conservatives over what form of government and whose interests would be advanced and protected. Mexico’s precarious state of affairs in this period is best reflected by the fact that between 1821 and 1857, on average, there was a new head of state every year.

While Mexico struggled, Spain, France, England, and the United States were themselves locked in intense rivalries precisely over their national boundaries. In 1803 Thomas Jefferson negotiated the purchase of the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon, a transfer Spain refused to recognize until 1819. That year, too, John Quincy Adams, President James Monroe’s secretary of state, signed the Transcontinental Treaty with Spain, purchasing Florida for $5 million. Spain thus acknowledged U.S. ownership of Louisiana; the United States conceded Spain’s sovereignty over all of Texas west of the Sabine River. In the midst of these diplomatic negotiations, the United States was monetarily aiding the independence movements of Spain’s colonies. In 1823 President Monroe pronounced what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, warning European powers that any foreign intervention in the hemisphere would be deemed a bellicose act that would provoke intervention by the United States.

It was in this contentious context over Mexico’s eventual shape and form that Mexican tejanos, and the Anglo immigrants who settled in Texas, declared their independence in 1836 as the Republic of Texas. A decade later, in 1845, the United States fabricated a border dispute to provoke war with Mexico. What for decades the United States had attempted to purchase with cash, it then took by force in the name of its “Manifest Destiny.” The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war in 1848, ceded close
to two-thirds of Mexico's national territory. The United States thus emerged as a nation that reached from coast to coast, with ports on the Pacific Ocean from which it could exploit the lucrative trade with Asia.

U.S. sovereignty over the ceded Mexican territories and over Texas, which was simultaneously annexed and became a state in 1845, created a new political order for the longtime residents of what became the American Southwest. Much as espanoles had established their military dominance over the indigenous peoples of Mexico after 1521, and marked that subjugation through a number of demeaning legal categories, so too citizens of the United States arrived in the Southwest vaunting their superiority, establishing structures of domination, and asserting that their primacy was rooted in their Protestant God, in their laws and constabularies, in the purity of their whiteness, and in their very way of life. Whereas in 1521 the colonists who arrived in the Americas from the Iberian Peninsula transformed their notions of group belonging to become espanoles with lordship over indios, so the soldiers and settlers who ventured westward after 1848 defined themselves as "Anglos" and "Anglo-Americans," calling the longtime residents "Mexicans," which as we saw above, was not particularly germane, given the recentness of Mexico's national independence. The process of linguistic erasure Christopher Columbus undertook by naming "Indians" where none had existed before likewise was used by the Americans to flatten Mexican class and ethnic distinctions, calling all locals "Mexicans" despite the fact that this denomination had never really developed roots.

The resident ethnic Mexican population used a number of Spanish-language words to describe their new Americans lords. When speaking Spanish the mexicanos called the outsiders extranjeros, or "foreigners," labeling themselves nativos, or "natives." As the number of migrants increased, the ethnic lexicon became more complex. They were called anglos, anglosajones, and americanos; with americanos or Americans becoming and remaining the most popular over time. But there were also a slew of other ethnic categories that were employed in the Spanish language that more acutely described the cultural politics of domination. Mexicano polychromatic sensitivities to race and color focused on the peculiarities of americano skin, eye, and hair color, and to the size of their feet. Accordingly, in newspapers and songs, in insults and expletives are found canosos (gray-haired), coloroso (red-faced), bolillo (doughy faced), cara de pan crudo (bread dough face), ojos de gato (cat eyes), and patén (big foot). Other Mexican ethnic labels for the Americans were the result of misunderstandings of the English language. The word gringo, for example, comes from a linguistic corruption of a song the Mexican soldiers heard the Texas rebels singing at the Alamó in 1836. The first two words of the prairie song "Green Grows the Grass of Kentucky" were heard by Mexicans as "grin gros" and, finally, as one word, gringos, which remains the most common way Americans are referred to when mexicanos want to express contempt and derision toward them as a dominant class. Because the americanos allegedly loved eating cabbage, or at least those of Irish origin were said to, they were often called repolleros, or "cabbage eaters."

And because of their penchant for chewing tobacco, rather than the Mexican custom of smoking it, they became known as maos tobaco.

Some of the negative ethnic categories used to describe the Americans originated farther south as insults first used by Mexicans to describe their French invaders. So was the case for the derogatory term gabacho. Its etymology is the Provençal word gabacho, which means "foreigner," but also "foggy" and "Frenchy." As is apparent from this etymology, gabacho was used in Spain and Mexico to express contempt for the French. The word gárrulo (blond) was similarly born in diplomatic relations with Mexicans describing the skin color of their French occupiers as devoid of color, as "empty," or huero. Anglo-Americans were equally adept at name-calling. The Mexican diet was the source of much inspiration. Most histories of the use of the word "greaser" to refer to Mexicans offer a utilitarian explanation noting the mexicanos' penchant for cooking with lard, which can be heated to high temperatures to rapidly cook food. The word was also used to describe Mexican oily skin, the logical result of cooking with and eating lard. These primal etymologies became more complex when referring to the labor Mexicans performed, particularly the dirty work of greasing the wheels of the carts on which they carried people and goods to markets. By the 1850s "greaser" had taken on overtly racist and segregationist meanings. One American passing through El Paso offered the following definition: A 'greaser' was a Mexican—originating in the filthy, greasy appearance of the natives. Contempt for Mexicans produced California's infamous 1885 "Greaser Act," which authorized authorities to arrest "all persons who are commonly known as 'Greasers'" or the issue of Spanish and Indian blood . . . who go armed and are not known to be peaceable and quiet persons, and who can give no good account of themselves. Subsequently, Mexicans are described as living in a segregated California town called "Greaser Gulch." From "greaser" other insults eventually emerged, such as "grease-ball" and "goo-go." From the Mexican diet came "pepper-belly," "taco-choker," "fríjole guzzler," "chili picker," and, for a woman, "hot tamale." When Americans entered the Southwest as a conquering caste, they reacted to the ethnic geography much as the Spaniards had in 1598; they saw few cultural distinctions and lumped everyone into large panethnic groups. Certain long-standing cleavages and status differentiations on the basis of race, occupation, legitimacy, property ownership, and even religion existed among the area's newly denominated mexicanos, who themselves had only become mexicanos with independence in 1821. In addition, the older, long-established Spanish residents of the area clearly deemed themselves superior and different from the Mexican immigrants who had started to cross the border into the United States in large numbers during the gold rush, and particularly after the 1880s as Mexico's modernization displaced many peasants northward, creating the conditions for Mexico's 1910 revolution. But through the eyes of Americans, the residents of the area all looked alike, dressed alike, spoke Spanish, and were fanatical Catholics. They were all Mexicans, pure and simple. The deep-seated racial prejudice among some...
americanos toward blacks was easily transferred to persons of Spanish origin due to their darker skin color.26

Calling someone a “Mexican” in 1850 was deeply insulting to a mexicano because the English word “Mexican” signified a dominated population, stigmatized by defeat and subordination. “Mexican” rapidly became the insulting expletive hurled to hurt its auditors as “mex,” “meskin,” “skin,” and “skindiver,” or modified with adjectives such as “dirty,” “stinking,” “greasy,” “lazy,” and “ugly.” M exicano responses to such insults came in two forms. First, they crafted distinctions in Spanish that were understood only within their linguistic community, and, second, they created larger imagined communities of belonging that were hemispheric and global in reach, far beyond the boundaries of the national geography of the United States in which they found themselves subordinated and marginalized. Although I have found no good example from 1850–1900 to illustrate the politics of language in such a colonial situation, the larger theoretical point here can be made with an example from the 1950s. Arthur L. Campa, a linguist who spent most of his career studying the nuances of Spanish use in the United States, in the 1950s asked long-time residents of New Mexico in Spanish what their ethnicity was. Most responded, “Soy mexicano” (I am Mexican). When he asked the same individuals what they liked to be called in English, they responded, “Spanish American.” Campa then again asked in Spanish, “What do you call a person from Mexico?” The response was “mexicano de México” (Mexican from Mexico). One informant remarked that in English such a person was simply a Mexican because “Mexican . . . is the most used when someone is being rude. . . . Example—dirty Mexican.” Another echoed this sentiment. “I’d rather not be called Mexican because of the stereotype remarks that are associated with it. Such as lazy, dirty, greaser, etc.”27

To understand the ethnic categories mexicanos chose for themselves or bore the brunt of, bear in mind that the effective sociopolitical conquest of the Southwest occurred in different temporal registers. Gold was discovered in California in 1848, six months after the Mexican War ended. It was thus here that we first find the californios invoking ethnic categories they would use as mexicanos to resist domination throughout the Southwest. As the world swept into California with the gold rush, the population quickly swelled, attracting Spaniards, Chileans, Peruvians, Panamanians, even Mexicans who had vast experience mining. In 1848 California had approximately 7,500 resident Mexicans. By 1850, the population had grown to 92,598; by 1860 it had reached 379,994.28 Similar demographic transformations occurred in Texas in the 1860s and 1870s, and in New Mexico in the years preceding and following the arrival of the railroad in 1879.

The californios referred to prospectors of Mexican nationality as mexicanos when speaking among themselves in Spanish, for they were indeed Mexicans. But when speaking English, they called these same miners “Mexicans,” a label the californios fiercely resisted when it was used to refer to them. Anglos saw no apparent physical or cultural difference between the californios and Mexicans; both were alike. To counter being stereotyped as a conquered population, to insist that they were unlike Mexican nationals, and to imagine membership in larger, liberatory spaces, californios began insisting that they were either latinoamericanos, or hispanosamericanos. Here, then, are the first Spanish-language invocations by the former españoles of Mexico’s far north, calling themselves in shortened form hispanos and latinos, which when translated into English circulated in print as “Latinos,” “Latin Americans,” “Hispanics,” and “Spanish Americans.”29

Readers with a contemporary understanding of the emergence of the word “Hispanic” as a U.S. census category in 1980, and “Latino” as an emergent panethicinity in the early 1970s, may justifiably wonder how this occurred. To understand this development, let us imagine the circumstances of the former creole elite in California, buffeted by the war and the gold rush, seeing their land fraudulently seized, their language denigrated, their schools closed, and their religion mocked. These were men and women who started patriotic societies, who were literate and who began to write, publish, and circulate their sentiments broadly, informing their communities and compatriots around the world how la raza hispana (the Hispanic race), how el pueblo latinoamericano (the Latin American people) of California were faring miserably under the rule of the United States. The capacious scope of their geographic horizons is apparent even in the names of the newspapers they published in Spanish. In San Francisco there was La Voz de México (The Voice of Mexico), El Nuevo Mundo (The New World), La Voz de Chile y de las Repúblicas Americanas (The Voice of Chile and of the American Republic), and El Eco del Pacífico (The Echo of the Pacific), which was the Spanish-language insert in the French daily L’Eco du Pacifique; in Los Angeles was El Amigo del Pueblo (The Friend of the People) and El Clamor Público (The Public Outcry).

Why did “Hispanic” and “Latino” emerge as words of collective self-description in the 1850s, given the many lexical alternatives that could have been used to describe the older-still resident Spanish colonial population? “Hispanic” is easier to explain simply because of the area’s genealogical origins as a Spanish colony. Living by then under U.S. sovereignty, the creole elites recalled nostalgically their former mother country, claimed they spoke castellano, ordered books and merchandise from Spain, and even had a Tienda Española (Spanish store) in San Francisco, where they could indulge themselves in memories of the good old days they hoped might return.30 Newspapers regularly called out their countrymen to employment opportunities and events with the headline “Aviso a los Hispano-Americanos” (An Announcement for Hispánic Americans), Nativos (natives) rallied against extranjeros (foreigners), referring to themselves as la raza Hispano Americana (the Hispanic American race), noting that a new bilingual school in Los Angeles sought students “de raza Española” (of the Spanish race) in 1856. Writing in English, Francisco Ramirez, the owner of the Los Angeles newspaper El Clamor Público, praised “the young and rising generation” as “Spanish-American.”31 Disgruntled by the race relations they faced in California after 1848, in 1856 a group consisting of “mexicanos, hispano-americanos y californios” (M exicans, Hispanic Americans, and Californians) formed a colonizing party for the purpose of emigrating from California southward to Sonora, Mexico, where they hoped they would thrive.
The word latinoamericano emerged in the years following the wars of independence in Spain's former colonies. Creole intellectuals from these newly independent nations turned to France for inspiration, finding in its revolutionary articulation of rights, liberty, and citizenship ways to think about their own freedom, emancipation, and autonomy. Residing in Paris and congregated around a young French intellectual named Michel Chevalier, in 1851 they discussed alternative modernities and subsequently invented “Latin America” as a way to map a new geography for the postcolonial global order. In the political ideology that birthed latinoamericana and latinidad, creole and mestizo elites imagined a hemispheric unity that would supersede and perhaps thwart the political and cultural impact of European imperialisms, and, most importantly, envisage Latin America as part of a world order. As Torres Caicedo, the Colombian intellectual who was catalytic in advancing the idea, noted, “There is Anglo-Saxon America, Danish America, Dutch America, etc.; there is also Spanish America, French America and Portuguese America; and therefore to this second group what other scientific name applies but Latin?”

Earlier in the century, Simón Bolívar had attempted to weld northern South America into a Gran Colombia, and from that to forge a larger “Confederation of Spanish American Nations.” By 1850, Bolívar had been dead for twenty years. The space he denominated “Spanish America” was forgotten, its glimmer revived as “Latin America,” and at century’s end, José Martí fleetingly reimagined it anew as Nuestra América, or “Our America.”

By the late 1890s, california were writing in newspapers about their membership in América latina (Latin America) and latinoamericana, calling themselves latinos as the shortened name for their hemispheric membership in la raza latina (the Latin race). Reprinting an 1858 opinion piece by a correspondent in Havana on race relations in the Americas, El Clamor Público of Los Angeles surmised that “two rival races are competing with each other . . . the Anglo Saxon and the Latin one [la raza latina].”

Hispano and latino, as abbreviated versions of Hispano-Americano and latinoamericano, flourished in California’s Spanish-language discourse during the second half of the nineteenth century but had virtually disappeared by the 1920s. The explanation for this appears to be found in the increasing number of Mexican immigrants fleeing the violence and displacement of the 1910–1917 Mexican Revolution and finding employment in California. From 1911 to 1920, 219,000 Mexican immigrants formally entered the United States; from 1921 to 1930, this number more than doubled reaching 459,287. In the face of this demographic increase, “Mexican” and “Mexican American” became prominent ways of describing the numerically ascendant immigrants and hispano, latino, in all of their Spanish-language forms virtually disappeared, only to reemerge to the east fifty years later, in Chicago in the 1970s.

Tejanos, like the california, called themselves mexicanos and latinoamericanos in Spanish-language discourse during the last half of the nineteenth century, but I have found no textual evidence of the use of Hispano-Americano. When the tejanos joined forces in 1896 with the Anglo settlers of Texas to form an independent republic, they decisively rejected their Mexican citizenship and membership in the Mexican nation, only to be constantly reminded in the language of their oppressors that whatever their wealth or rank, they were still nothing but dirty, stinking Mexicans. In the 1920s, faced with the same discrimination and prejudice Mexican immigrants suffered in California, the old-time tejanos insisted on being called “Latin Americans” (latinoamericanos) in polite, English-speaking company. Indeed, this was the self-referential English word they chose in 1929 when tejano community leaders established the first major Mexican American civil rights organization in the United States, calling it the League of United Latin American Citizens, or LULAC for short.

The pace of demographic change was much slower in New Mexico because the monetization of land did not reach a fevered pitch until the arrival of the railroad in 1879 and because statehood was not won until 1912. Unlike in California and Texas where Mexican immigrants quickly outnumbered the natives, few Mexican peasants who had been displaced by modernization arrived in New Mexico in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and fewer refugees of the Mexican Revolution found safety and employment there, so norteamericanos were able to hold on to their older identities as españoles and hispanoamericanos much longer. Hispanoamericano was often translated into English as “Spanish American.” A. Gabriel Meléndez and Doris Meyer, historians of the New Mexico nineteenth-century Spanish-language print culture explain that the word hispanoamericano was used frequently to resist Anglo-American racism while simultaneously asserting their membership in a larger transnational, global community that existed to protect their liberty and rights. The editors of Spanish-language newspapers formed La Asociación de la Prensa Asociada Hispano-Americana in Las Vegas, New Mexico, in 1892, to serve as “the trustee and defender of the race it represents.” Writing on March 31, 1893, in El Sol de Mayo, which was published in Las Vegas, New Mexico, Manuel C. de Baca wrote that the press association would “take up . . . its duty . . . so that hispanoamericano will bring to an end the repeated injuries that all too frequently are directed at them.” For as the publisher of the Taos, New Mexico, La Revista de Taos announced in the “Himno del Hispano” (the Hispanic’s Hymn) in 1915,
We were born on this land, 
Not to endure abuses 
That cry for almighty justice. 36

By the 1920s Mexican immigrants had arrived throughout the Southwest in large numbers; New Mexico was by then no exception, recruiting cheap labor for agriculture and mining. New Mexico's nativo reacted to these numbers by distancing and differentiating themselves as hispanoamericanos, or as "Spanish Americans," when speaking or writing in English, not wanting to be lumped together with Mexican nationals, whom they viewed as rough and uncouth members of the lower class. New Mexico had long been historically marginal to New Spain, to central Mexico, even to the Republic of Mexico once it gained independence. This fact prompted one man to state, "My identity has always been closer to Spanish as an ethnic group and for that reason I consider myself Spanish. . . . Being from northern New Mexico the only connection I have with anything Mexican is as a tourist and not as my national origin." 37

Novelist Erna Fergusson proposed that the ethnic category "Spanish American" came into popular use in New Mexico after World War I to counter the Anglo-American perception that soldiers who called themselves mexicanos when speaking in Spanish were aliens from another country. Anthropologist Nancie González largely concurred. The term "Spanish American" emerged in response to an upsurge of prejudice and discrimination against Spanish speakers in New Mexico during the 1920s. 38

Arizona too had a core of original settler españoles who had been residing there since the 1690s. On January 14, 1894, Carlos Velasco, Pedro Pellón, Mariano Samaniego, and some forty-six other men gathered in Tucson to establish the Alianza Hispano-Americana, which announced as its motto "Protección, Moralidad, e Instrucción," or "the protection of Hispano-Americanos (Hispanic Americans)" through mutual aid and fraternalism, through a morality that focused on the common good, and through the acquisition of knowledge that would lead to self-improvement and communal advance. 39

By 1930 the Alianza Hispano-Americana had become the largest ethnic Mexican fraternal organization in the United States, with more than 17,000 members scattered throughout the Southwest. It did this by rallying españoles and mexicanos in Arizona, and then in New Mexico and California, to the effects of Anglo-American racism on their daily lives, the need for the development of a group consciousness to resist and thwart it, and a cultural solidarity across the class divide that then existed among Mexicanos. But the massive levels of Mexican immigration into Arizona that started during the 1910 revolution and accelerated in the 1920s produced similar tensions between Spanish and Mexican group membership. Whereas in New Mexico the local españoles differentiated themselves from the immigrants at that moment by calling themselves "Spanish Americans," and in Spanish hispanos, in Arizona hispano-americano disappeared from print, along with the Spanish-language newspapers that had kept it alive, and one can only speculate that it also eventually fell out of use in conversation. 40

As should be obvious from these examples of ethnic categories fashioned in the American Southwest, first in response to Anglo-American conquest and then to massive levels of Mexican immigration, the longtime local populations called themselves hispanos and hispanoamericanos to assert their racial whiteness. They claimed Spanish origins as Spaniards, and by so doing, doggedly resisted being labeled "nonwhite" and thus presumed to be of the same lowly status as blacks. Whenever Anglo-Americans have wanted to depict the Spanish origins of the ethnic Mexicans in the United States positively and affirmatively, they have referred to them as "Spanish," "Spanish Americans," "Spanish speakers," and "individuals of Spanish surname," thereby declaring them ancestrally tied to European civilization and racial whiteness. Identifying someone as Spanish immediately signaled membership in a set of overlapping groups—religious, linguistic, legal, and cultural—that through Spain could be tied back to Rome. In Racial Faulkner: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California, sociologist Tomás Almaguer argues that in the racial order in which Californios found themselves after 1848, they invoked Spanish and Hispanic origins to establish the de jure whiteness they had been accorded by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo but that rarely materialized de facto. In the racial hierarchy Anglo-Americans imposed throughout the Southwest, the cultural connection to European and Roman origins, as remote as it might be, was what made the Californios superior to Indians, Asians, and African Americans, who had no comparable claims to whiteness. 41

Thus far we have discussed two instances of military conquest—the Spanish colonization of the indigenous peoples who resided in Mexico's far north that began in 1598, and the annexation of this same territory by the United States in 1848 at the end of the Mexican War—to illustrate how ethnic labels and emergent nationalisms were named and imposed from above, but equally resisted from below, employing code switching into a different language to demarcate "us" and "them." We turn now to a third example of the conjuring of national aspirations and their ideal ordering through the process of naming. Above, we discussed the mid-nineteenth century origins of the word "Latino" as an English-language panethnicity that brings together, from below, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, and a range of Latin American—origin immigrants in the United States. In this section we will also turn to the word "Hispanic," which likewise entered our vocabulary as an English-language word imposed from above, by the U.S. Census Bureau in 1980, to aggregate Latin American—origin peoples as a panethnic group.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines a "Latino" (note that it is now an English word found in most American English dictionaries) as "A Latin-American inhabitant of the United States." According to the OED, the word's etymology is latinoamericano, which in Spanish means "Latin American." The OED offers several historical uses of the word, starting in 1945 and running to 1974, when "Latino" entered popular parlance among English speakers. The first recorded use of the word "Latino" in print appeared
in 1946, in a book entitled *San Antonio*, which describes a musical performance by a group of Latin American exchange students that took place at the University of Texas. G. Peyton, the book's author, snidely remarks, "That in itself would be a fresh intellectual experience for Texas, where Latinos are usually looked on as sinister specimens of an inferior race." Next came Lady Bird Johnson's *White House Diary*, which contained an entry for April 2, 1970, noting that "Six young girls, all Latinos, had encased themselves in cardboard boxes" during a White House lawn party for the Latin American diplomatic corps. Finally, *The Black Panther*, the Black Panther Party's newspaper, reported on March 17, 1973: "A program was drawn up... by an... action group composed of Blacks, Latinos, and Whites."42

The first two recorded references to "Latinos" in English were tied geographically to ethnic understandings of group membership and belonging in Texas, where calling someone a "Mexican" in the 1940s was extremely insulting. In polite English-speaking company, if the intention was to praise or honor ethnic Mexicans, they were called "Latin Americans." If the intent was to ostracize and humiliate, they were simply "Mexicans." As we have seen, the first Mexican American civil rights organization in the country was named the League of United Latin American Citizens by its Texas founders.43 What should also be highlighted in the above-cited OED passages from G. Peyton's book and *The Black Panther* newspaper is that "Latino" referred to an "inferior race." In the late 1960s members of minority communities began recognizing three distinct races—black, white, and Latino—to signal that American society had moved beyond its simple black/white racial dichotomy, which no longer adequately described the racism persons of Latin American origin experienced in the United States.

Sociologists Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut tell us that when immigrants and their progeny enter American society and are largely greeted with hostility, segregation, and overtly racist acts, they react negatively, often gathering defensively and collectively to assert their own dignity and self-worth. *Latinidad*, that communal sense of membership in a group tied to Latin America through ancestry, language, culture, and history, emerged from below precisely out of such nationalistic sentiments. Individuals first started calling themselves "Latinos" in cities like Chicago and New York, largely to advance political agendas not easily achievable by small, isolated, and distinct national-origin groups. By coming together as Latinos, they swelled their numbers, and expanded their political clout as they demanded inclusion in the polity through affirmative action, fair housing, voting rights, and bilingual education. In time Latinidad was also championed from above by ethnic specific civil rights organizations seeking grander nationwide influence and larger membership rolls. Eventually, government bureaucrats, foundations, and corporate marketers recognized the utility of Latinidad. Its broadest diffusion has been at the hands of media conglomerates and advertising companies.44

Ethnic Mexicans are the largest, best documented, and most regionally dispersed of the immigrant groups that hail from Latin America whose members often call them-
of sentiment and activity for the proclamation of Puerto Rican independence since 1810, it has been repeatedly thwarted by Spain, and then by the United States. The latter had long coveted the island as a way of achieving its own larger geopolitical visions of hemispheric empire and repeatedly asserted such claim, at various times offering to buy the island from Spain. In 1898 the United States provoked war with Spain over the Philippines, which quickly spread to the Caribbean as well. When the Spanish-American War ended with the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the United States emerged as the victor and took possession of Cuba and Puerto Rico, quickly smashing Puerto Rico’s independence movement, establishing its sovereignty over the island with the 1900 Foraker Act, and declaring Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States through the Jones Act of 1917.

Puerto Rico’s population remained largely confined to the island between 1900 and 1930, with approximately 1,800 individuals migrating to the mainland yearly during this period. This trend accelerated in the years before World War II, when increasing numbers migrated to New York City to take its unskilled jobs and to enter military rolls. In 1940 there were 65,667 Puerto Ricans living on the mainland, the vast majority in New York City. By 1950 that number had increased to 226,110, by 1970 to 1,391,464, by 2000 to 3.4 million, and by 2013 to 3 million. While in 1940, 88 percent of all Puerto Ricans on the mainland lived in New York state, by 1980 they were much more dispersed, with only 49 percent in New York, 12 percent in New Jersey, 6.4 percent in Illinois, and approximately 4.5 percent in California, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. By 2010, only about 20 percent of mainland Puerto Ricans resided in New York City.46

The problems Puerto Ricans faced in the United States were not unlike those of Mexican Americans. While the presence of Mexicans in the United States had long been suspect and equated with illegality, Puerto Ricans have been de jure citizens since 1917, but rarely treated so de facto. Their life chances on the mainland have been limited, despite repeated scholarly studies proclaiming that they too eventually would be integrated into the American body politic as other immigrant groups had. If they learned English, took American brides, accepted the Protestant work ethic, and persevered in school, they too would move out of their ghettos and gain political representation and upward mobility. In 1975 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued a report entitled Puerto Ricans in the Continental United States: An Uncertain Future that concluded that the majority of Puerto Ricans were living in substandard housing, were unemployed and living in poverty, had poor access to education and health care, and inordinately suffered from racial discrimination. Ten years after the United States declared a “War on Poverty,” Puerto Ricans remained in the ranks of the war-scarred poor.47

I recite this history of inequities Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans have experienced to help explain what led them to abandon older forms of political activism rooted in self-help associations, in mutual aid societies, in labor unions, and in ethnic churches, for the militant, reactive nationalism they forged in the late 1960s. Mexican Americans then announced themselves “Chicanos” as a colonized nationality demand-
Here lies Juan
Here lies Miguel
Here lies Olga
Here lies Manuel
Who died yesterday today
And will die again tomorrow
Always broke
Always owing
Never knowing
That they are beautiful people
Never knowing
The geography of their complexion
PUERTO RICO IS A BEAUTIFUL PLACE
PUERTORICOS ARE A BEAUTIFUL RACE

Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales's poem "I Am Joaquin," similarly was meant to incite Chicano rebellion and cultural pride. The poem, excerpted here, begins and ends as follows:

\[\text{Yo soy Joaquin,} \]
\[\text{perdido en un mundo de confusión:} \]
\[\text{I am Joaquin,} \]
\[\text{lost in a world of confusion,} \]
\[\text{caught up in the whirl of a gringo society,} \]
\[\text{confused by the rules, scorned by attitudes,} \]
\[\text{suppressed by manipulation, and destroyed by modern society . . .} \]
\[\text{in all the fertile farmlands,} \]
\[\text{the barren plains,} \]
\[\text{the mountain villages,} \]
\[\text{smoke-smeared cities,} \]
\[\text{we start to MOVE.} \]
\[\text{La raza!} \]
\[\text{Méjicano!} \]
\[\text{Español!} \]
\[\text{Latino!} \]
\[\text{Chicano!} \]
\[\text{Or whatever I call myself,} \]
\[\text{I look the same} \]
\[\text{I feel the same} \]
\[\text{I cry} \]
\[\text{And} \]
\[\text{Sing the same.} \]
\[\text{I am the masses of my people and} \]
\[\text{I refuse to be absorbed.} \]
\[\text{I am Joaquin.} \]

The odds are great
But my spirit is strong,
My faith unbreakable,
My blood is pure.
I am Aztec prince and Christian Christ.
I SHALL ENDURE!
I WILL ENDURE!

The "Plan Espiritual de Aztlán," the 1969 document that birthed the Chicano student movement, offered a capacious blueprint for how national unity and political empowerment would be achieved. It called for unity among all racially oppressed groups, for community control over local institutions and the communitarian management of its resources through responsible capitalism, for culturally relevant educational curricula with community control of schools, for the development of institutions that would protect Chicano civil and human rights and guarantee fair wages, for community self-defense through humanitarianism, for a contestational cultural politics "to defeat the gringo dollar value system," and for the rejection of the two-party system for a more equitable pluralist politics.52

In the forty-seven years since the plan was issued, many have questioned the nationalism it spawned as crude because it fractured the liberal civil rights coalition that was being forged, and because it celebrated a culture of violence, hypermasculinity, sexism, and homophobia that was on display not only in boardrooms but in bedrooms too. The plan nevertheless created an alternative vision of cultural incorporation and membership in a body politic, challenged unbridled capitalism, and framed the local in relationship to the global, simultaneously linking local struggles for self-determination with global anti-imperialist ones. It created organizations for community policing, food cooperatives, and educational campaigns for safer food, healthier bodies, and sharper minds.

The thirteen-point platform of the Puerto Rican Young Lords made almost identical demands:

We want community control of our institutions and land. We want control of our communities by our people and programs to guarantee that all institutions serve the needs of our people. People's control of police, health services, churches, schools, housing, transportation, and welfare are needed. We want an end to attacks on our land by urban renewal, highway destruction, and university corporations. LAND BELONGS TO ALL THE PEOPLE!53

The oppositional consciousness and militant nationalism Chicanos and Boricuas articulated established the groundwork for the emergence of Latinidad. As far as I have been able to ascertain, Chicago was the place an explicit sense of group membership as Latinos emerged into public visibility, precisely out of older coalitional politics. Mexi-
can Americans and Puerto Ricans there understood that if they were to enhance their material lives, they had to come together to advance collective goals. In the early 1970s, this took the form of the La Coalition Latinoamericana de Empleos. Instead of translating the group’s name literally as “The Latin American Jobs Coalition,” they chose “The Spanish Coalition for Jobs.” Composed of twenty-three Puerto Rican and Mexican American community organizations, the coalition explicitly militated for the improvement of “Latinos” lives though work, demanding first that Illinois Bell Telephone and Jewel Tea Company honor federal affirmative action policies. As the coalition’s foundational document explained, they had united because “the racist attitude of employers triggered us into utilizing our consumer power as a tool or bargaining device . . . to compete in the job market.”

Illinois Bell was their first target. In 1971 coalition representatives repeatedly met with the company’s management to question why its workforce of 44,000 included only 300 Latinos, demanding that 3,000 new Latino workers be hired. Illinois Bell’s retort was an offer of 115 jobs. What followed was the first mass action organized in the name of Latinos, and the group picketed the company’s headquarters in Chicago starting in mid-September 1971. On June 14, 1972, a settlement was reached. Illinois Bell agreed to hire 1,323 Latinos and two top-level executives by the end of 1976, and would form a community review committee to chart the company’s progress toward these goals.

The coalition next targeted Chicago’s Jewel Tea Company, presenting it with similar demands in March 1972. The company had received more than $350,000 from the federal government to train minority workers for work in their stores, yet only 140 Latinos had been hired. The coalition cited statistics about Jewel’s workforce and the underrepresentation of Latinos. After almost a year of picketing, in the summer of 1973, Jewel agreed to hire more Latinos through an independent job placement agency.

These initial successes intensified the coalition’s sense of unity, and on March 16, 1973, it convened a “Latino Strategies for the 70s” conference. The press release for the event announced: “The brown skin Latino has awakened and he will never be the same again . . . because he knows that to live is to enjoy freedom. He has learned that to be a Latino is good.” Among the many conference outcomes was the formation of the “Latino Institute” to bring into constant contact the coalition’s initial constituent groups. The Latino Institute took as its first major goal the education of Latino parents about bilingual education, teaching parents how to advocate for it, how to choose from the range of bilingual education models, and how to evaluate a school’s progress in educating their children in their native Spanish language.

Since the emergence of Latinidad as a panethnic form of consciousness that emphasized an antiracist coalitional politics among Chicago’s Latinos in the early 1970s, a number of studies have appeared chronicling different aspects of it in other American cities. What makes it difficult to compare these works is that when they articulate the contours of Latinidad, they have very different notions of its embodiment and deployment in mind. Two well-regarded studies of Latinidad take a bottom-up perspective for the emergence of panethnicity, arguing that the daily experiences of social interaction on neighborhood streets, in residences, in markets, in houses of worship, and in workplaces foster a sense of commonality among immigrants from many Latin American countries. Two books maintain that women are the active agents who diffuse and cement Latinidad as lived experience: Carol Hardy-Fanta’s Latina Politics, Latino Politics: Gender, Culture, and Political Participation in Boston, which focuses on language politics surrounding bilingual education and campaigns to elect Latino candidates to political posts, and Milagros Ricourt and Ruby Danta’s Latinas de Queens: Latino Panethnicity in a New York City Neighborhood, which studies how women in Corona and Queens interact. When women gather in the stairwells of their apartment buildings to gossip about local affairs, when women commiserate about the poor education their children receive, when they gather at the local laundromat, when they wrangle over the price of tomatoes and potatoes with a local vendor, and when they chat about their personal worlds and commiserate over their life challenges, they interact in the Spanish language, connect with Latin Americans from different places, and by doing so give Latinidad tangible meanings. Of course, immigrants from Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala do not quickly or easily lose their national identities, but by constantly interacting, or so these female authors contend, women are creating the behavioral, interactional foundation for Latinidad.

Open up any newspaper, listen to any talk radio show, or watch the television pundits, and what they repeatedly announce is that Latinos are an emerging majority that every day is becoming more potent in politics, commerce, and the very racial makeup of the United States. How much unity exists among Latinos? How operative and decisive is Latinidad in the lives of people who claim it or among the individuals who are lumped into this imagined community? The simple demographic fact is that the Latino population of the United States is large and diverse, encompassing more than twenty nationalities, and numerous languages that include a complex tapestry of indigenous ones. Latinos occupy various class locations and span the entire spectrum of race and color. Nothing specifically unites Latinos. In the past Roman Catholicism was such a glue for many, but even here Protestant evangelical churches and indigenous religious factionalize that unity, if indeed it ever existed. In places where the two largest Latino groups—Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans—have been in close contact for long periods, relationships of affiliation and trust exist, as well as relationships of chauvinism and suspicion. As Nicholas de Genova and Ana Y. Ramos-Zayas make clear in their study of relations between Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago during the late 1990s, a period only twenty years after the exuberance of Latino unity in the 1970s chronicled above, relations between the two groups were tense and were often marked by antagonism. Mexicans resented Puerto Ricans because of their citizenship status, which entitled them to welfare and government assistance, and thus constantly demonized them as lazy, welfare dependent, and abusers of state benefits for the poor. Mexicans suffered the stigma of illegality, of being unauthorized immigrants in the
United States, and thus were seen by Puerto Ricans as persons who allowed themselves to be exploited easily, accepting minimal wages and operating in an underworld of illicit drugs, prostitution, and gangs to make their way in the United States. Thus, whatever unity and political cohesion Latinidad provided these two groups in Chicago in the 1970s, by 2000 that sentiment had evaporated into fractious relations, largely because of the growth of the unauthorized Mexican immigrant population that began competing with Puerto Ricans for low-paying jobs.

By now, attentive readers may be wondering about the place of Cuban Americans in this history of the radicalization of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in the United States. The Cuban Revolution occurred in 1959, but it was not until the early 1960s that significant numbers of Cubans fled the island for residence ninety miles away, concentrating mostly in Miami and more generally in Florida. The Cubans who arrived in the United States as political refugees fleeing Communism were of a much higher class (mostly elites and middle-class professionals), carried immensely more money and cultural capital with them, often already had homes and businesses in the United States, and quickly became beneficiaries of affirmative action programs meant for persons who had had fewer privileges and opportunities in American life. What radicalism Cuban refugees did express was focused on the regime of Fidel Castro, on their return to Cuba to overthrow the Cuban Revolution, and was entirely anti-Communist in nature.

Cuban Americans did not actively participate in claiming or shaping Latinidad because of their class positions and their laser-like focus on the overthrow of Castro’s regime. They were nevertheless instrumental in domesticating and naturalizing Latinidad, transforming it from an oppositional and reactive sentiment to a media and marketing one primarily focused on the consumption of Latin American panethnic services and goods. In the 1950s much of the advertising by American firms that took place in Latin America was designed and purchased in Havana, Miami, and New York. After the Cuban Revolution, many of the Cuban advertising executives immigrated to New York and Miami, whence they resumed their activities. In the 1970s and 1980s, these mostly Cuban Americans started a process of combining Latin American national groups into a larger marketing sector, which they also called “Latino.” If they could create a clearly larger Latino market than was represented by individual national groups, and identify its needs and desires, they stood to profit enormously as individuals and as the advertising firms that knew precisely how to pitch products to this group. With that expertise they stood ready to persuade the large corporations producing food, beverages, and a host of domestic goods that Latinos constituted a significant mass market that needed special ad campaigns that only their advertising agencies were expertly prepared to create. This is exactly what happened, argues Arlene Dávila in Latinos Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People. These advertising people began educating the manufacturers of products about what the Latino market wanted and would consume. The producers then purchased advertising campaigns targeted to the Latino market the ad agencies had invented. Quickly, then, beer, soda pop, cooking oil, even bleach came to embody lo latino, that unique Latino essence that only the Coors Brewing Company, PepsiCo, General Foods, and Clorox could deliver.

The power of the advertising dollar and the reach of global media were also, in part, responsible for the popularization of the fiction that another word, “Hispanic,” best described the putative sense of unity that existed among immigrants from Latin America residing in the United States. The U.S. Census Bureau introduced “Spanish/Hispanic origin” as a panethnic category for purposes of official data gathering and analysis in 1980. But the movement toward its codification and use was complicated, the product of negotiations with community representatives, elected officials, and state functionaries. The mobilization of ethnic communities for civil rights in the 1960s, the emergence of massive social unrest in cities across the country, and the radical nationalism young men and women began to expound as Chicanos and Boricuas all gained the attention of the Congress and of the administrations of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon. Seeking to defuse and moderate the increasingly radical segments of these groups, in 1967, through executive order, Johnson established the Inter-Agency Committee on Mexican American Affairs (IMAA). The committee held hearings and funneled federal resources to potentially incendiary spots, increasing employment and manpower training and making the government aware of the militancy percolating in the streets. When Nixon entered the White House, he equivocated on what to do with the committee, and left it to the Congress to extend its life. It did. On December 31, 1969, President Nixon signed the bill creating the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish Speaking People (CCOSSP). The morphing of the IMAA into a vastly expanded CCOSSP had been the result of congressional and representative politics. Among the complainants were Puerto Ricans and Cubans who felt that their grievances had been ignored by the government’s almost exclusive focus on African Americans and Mexican Americans. By expanding the purview of CCOSSP to the three ethnic groups, then calling this aggregation “Spanish speakers,” the Congress and the Nixon administration were simultaneously launching a number of boils. Congressman Edward Roybal (D-CA), explained the reasons for his authorship of the bill creating CCOSSP:

The militants in our community are on our backs almost every moment of the day. And the question that is being asked of me, members of Congress, and other elected officials is, "Is it necessary for us to riot? Is it necessary for us to burn down a town before the government looks at our problems objectively? What are we to do if our community is not recognized?" Those of us who represent the Spanish-speaking communities have quite a problem on our hands. We do not want to see the violence of Watts erupt in East Los Angeles or anyplace else, and I hope that this will never come about. But the answers must be found, and I believe that one of the answers is the establishment of the [CCOSSP].
Senator Joseph M. Montoya (D-NM), the co-author of the legislation creating CCOSSP, wanted the panethnic aggregation of Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans to be called "Hispanic," and by 1980 it was.

The same activists who had lobbied Congress and gotten the federal government to create CCOSSP realized that if Mexican American issues were to receive the same level of national attention African American issues got, they needed a nationwide organization to advance their cause. In *Making Hispanics: How Activists, Bureaucrats, and Media Constructed a New American*, G. Cristina Mora studies such a transformation for the Southwest Council of La Raza. Founded in 1968 as a local, grassroots organization to fight poverty and discrimination with a regional focus primarily in Texas and California, by 1972 the Southwest Council of La Raza had become the National Council of La Raza, modeled after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Hoping to serve as the interlocutor for the entire Hispanic population of the United States, it opened a headquarters office in Washington, DC, and began to advocate not only for Mexican Americans, but on behalf of the social, political, and economic concerns of all Hispanics. As Mora argues, the organization's transformation occurred by first recognizing and harnessing popular identification with Hispanics, then developing a national vision and mission that included the issues of all persons of Latin American origin in the United States. With an organization, a national office, and an emergent political identity, the National Council of La Raza created the infrastructure and authority to get philanthropic groups to recognize it as the interlocutor for all Hispanics, and accordingly generously fund its work, as indeed the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations did. Finally, it gained such national visibility and economic support that the federal government sought its advice as well, calling on it to help the U.S. Census Bureau craft the ethnic categories that would be used in subsequent decennial counts. While in 1980 the U.S. household census had first asked "Is this person of Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent?" in the 2000 count "Latino" was used as equal to "Spanish/Hispanic origin." Mora argues that for "Latino" to emerge as a panethnicity, it needed not only ideological and institutional foundations, which were quickly harnessed, but it also needed a source of diffusion, which it got from Univision, the Spanish-language television network in the United States that generated its own programming aimed to appeal to American Hispanics, supplemented by programming the network purchased from other countries in the Hispanophone world.43

The scholarly literature suggests that for panethnicity to emerge, one first needs a population that is significantly marginalized and exploited, and one that comes to see itself as such, in opposition to the group it deems the dominant, oppressive one. Once such a reactive ethnicity is in place, demography and geographic isolation through segregation has brought together ethnic groups that previously had no common history or mutual interests. Much of the world's ethnic politics are language politics; that

Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, or for that matter any other combinations of Latin American national groups, shared a common language and sometimes also a common religious culture, made it easier for panethnicity to emerge, get propagated, and get institutionalized from above through such things as the boundary-making national census, or from below through interactions, commisseration, and mobilization. Evidence from Chicago over a period of forty years also shows that state action, a changing demographic balance between immigrants and the native born, between citizens and noncitizens, and more intense competition between national/ethnic groups over local resources can just as easily breed antagonisms and hatreds where once mutuality and common understanding were deemed necessary for sociality and communal advancement. Reflecting on why the 1960 count had not included a panethnic category that encompassed Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cuban Americans, one census official stated that back then they "didn't really identify [with one another, and] didn't really know what Hispanic meant." This essay has tried to show how group relations evolve over time, how state and institutional actors, journalists and media executives, as well as community organizations, all have played a role in how categories of belonging and group consciousness emerge, are sustained, and, just as often, disappear to be replaced by others.

NOTES

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5. The details of contact between Spaniards and Indians can be found in Ramón A.
Gutiérrez, When Jesus Came, the Corn Mothers Went Away: Marriage, Sexuality and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).
40. Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States, p. 133.
55. Ibid., pp. 96–97.
56. Ibid., pp. 96–97.